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1.   Introduction 
In many industries, manufacturers reply upon independent retailers to distribute their 
products as manufacturers can benefit from retailers’ reputations, economies of scale, and 
knowledge about local markets. However, manufacturers and retailers being independent 
agents act in their own best interest. A supply chain composed of independent agents acting 
in their own best interests will generally not achieve system-wide efficiency, often due to 
some incongruence between incentives faced locally and the global optimization problem, a 
phenomenon known in the economics literature as “double marginalization”. (Spengler 
1950, Tirole 1988). 
To efficiently use the supply chain one needs some mechanisms to coordinate supply chain 
to maximize total channel profit. Coordination of the supply chain implies that the profit of 
the supply chain is maximized, hence achieving system-wide efficiency. One way to 
coordinate channel decisions is by using a returns policy provided by the manufacturer. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of the benefits and costs 
of returns policies. Section 3 reviews the different kinds of returns policies that are required 
to coordinate the supply chain for the different types of products. Section 4 discusses how 
returns policies will be affected by demand uncertainty and Section 5 studies the impact that 
demand uncertainty together with retailing competition has on returns policies. Section 6 
provides a conclusion of the paper. 
2. Overview of return policies 
A returns policy for excess inventory is a commitment made by a manufacturer, or 
distributor upstream when accepting products from a downstream channel member. The 
most generous policy promises to refund the full wholesale price for all returned products, 
while less generous policies offer credits against future orders. A partial returns policy gives 
only partial credits or refunds. (Padmanabhan & Png 1995) 
The format of returns policies varies in and across industries. Manufacturers and 
distributors across a wide range of products have long allowed retailers to return excess 
inventory. Today, returns policies are common in the distribution of books, magazines and 
newspapers, recorded music, computer hardware and software, greeting cards and 
pharmaceuticals. (Padmanabhan & Png 1995) O
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 2.1 Benefits of returns policies 
At the most superficial level, returns policies will encourage retailers to carry larger stocks. 
From the manufacturer’s standpoint, the more retailers sell, the higher the manufacturer’s 
profit will be. Returns policies are thus beneficial to both the manufacturers and retailers. 
Below is a discussion of the benefits to the retailers.   
2.1.1 Mitigate retailers’ risk 
Uncertain product demand is the reason for retailers’ reluctance to carry more stock as they 
fear having excess inventory. By stocking conservatively, retailers limit the manufacturer’s 
potential sales. The manufacturers can mitigate the retailers’ risk of having excess inventory 
by offering returns policies which will encourage the retailers to stock more products and 
hence increase the sales of the manufacturers. (Padmanabhan & Png 1995) 
2.1.2 Safeguard the brand 
The institution of returns policies will discourage retailers from marking down the price of 
the product when it is nearing the expiration date and selling of stale products. Returns 
policies are a more attractive way of dealing with expiring products and will help to 
safeguard the manufacturer’s brand. (Padmanabhan & Png 1995) 
2.1.3 Support end-user returns policy 
The institution of return policies will be beneficial to retailers as it allows them to return 
products to the manufacturers when they are pressured to accept returns from their own 
customers. End users want to be able to return products to retailers to safeguard against the 
risk that the product will not satisfy them. (Padmanabhan & Png 1995) 
2.1.4 Facilitate distribution of new product information 
Returns policies may aid information transmission between manufacturers and retailers 
more effectively. A manufacturer that is sure its products will sell well can afford to offer a 
generous returns policy, knowing that retailers will not return the items as explained by 
Chu (1993). Hence a returns policy is one way a new manufacturer can credibly signal 
information about expected market demand and product quality. (Padmanabhan & Png 
1995) 
Since returns policies also place the consequence of product failure on the manufacturers, 
the incentives of the manufacturers and retailers are thus aligned. As a result, a returns 
policy is also a way the manufacturer can commit to investments in advertising, promotion 
and other activities to enhance product sales. (Padmanabhan & Png 1995) 
Returns policies also serve as forms of assurance to the retailers that a manufacturer will not 
bring out new products so quickly that the retailers’ stock will be obsolete. If the 
manufacturer does so, retailers can return the superseded items, hence punishing the 
manufacturer. (Padmanabhan & Png 1995) 
2.1.5 Structure competition 
A returns policy strengthens a manufacturer’s position relative to other competing brands as 
it reduces the cost of carrying excess inventory and tilts the balance in the retailers’ mind 
towards carrying larger stocks of the manufacturer’s product. As a result, the probability of 
a stock-out and of consumers switching to competing brands will be lower. Hence the 
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institution of returns policies has strategic implications for manufacturer’s profits by having 
an impact on competition among retailers and brands. (Padmanabhan & Png 1995) 
2.2 Costs of returns policies 
When some of the additional stocks are returned, a returns policy generates additional costs 
for the manufacturer which will be discussed below. 
2.2.1 Logistics costs 
One of the costs incurred by a returns policy is the logistic costs of organizing, packing, and 
shipping of products back and forth. Depreciation cost is another cost that the manufacturer 
incurred on returned items. Returned items depreciate as they may be damaged in 
shipment, decay physically or lose their marketability over time. (Padmanabhan & Png 
1995) 
2.2.2 Demand uncertainty 
The demand for products such as new books, CDs, software and pharmaceuticals is 
uncertain. Since a returns policy transfers the cost of excess stocks from retailers to the 
manufacturer, the more uncertain demand is, the greater the cost of a returns policy to the 
manufacturer. (Padmanabhan & Png 1995) 
2.2.3 Retailer incentives 
By reducing the risk of losses due to excess inventory, a returns policy lessens some of the 
retailer’s incentive to invest in efforts to promote retail sales by merchandising, doing point-
of-sale advertising and providing attractive shelf space. (Padmanabhan & Png 1995) Hence, 
when manufacturer accepts the risk from the retailer, the retailer’s incentive to invest in 
promotional efforts may be dulled and this is a cost to the manufacturer.  
2.3 Implementation of returns policies 
The partial returns policy which rebates only part of the wholesale price for return items is 
most widely implemented to address the retailers’ incentive to overstock and avoid point-
of-sale marketing efforts. In this way, the manufacturer and the retailer share the risk, hence 
providing some incentives for all parties to play their part. Partial risk gives the 
manufacturer an incentive to support the product and to select new introductions carefully 
while partial risk gives retailers the incentive to order conservatively and promote the 
product. Ultimately, the aim of the partial returns policy is to coordinate the supply chain to 
maximize total channel profit.  
Some other kinds of partial returns policy are those with a time limit for returns as well as 
those which take into consideration a retailer’s returns history into decisions on pricing, 
credit and even on whether to continue dealing with the retailer.  
A time-consuming and expensive way for a manufacturer to devise returns policies for a 
mix of retailers that differ in risk aversion, competitiveness and skepticism is to tailor a 
returns policy for each retailer. Another way is to design a menu of alternative returns 
policies such as more generous returns policies with higher wholesale prices or strict limits 
on returns with lower wholesale prices and allow every retailer to choose among the 
options. (Padmanabhan & Png 1995) 
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3. Types of products 
This section will investigate the different kinds of returns policies that are required to 
coordinate the supply chain for the different types of products, namely perishable 
commodities, style goods, catalogue style goods, experience goods, Internet sales and build-
to-order products.  
3.1 Perishable commodities 
Perishable commodities are short life-cycle items with limited shelf or demand life such as 
newspapers, baked goods, periodicals and records. 
An earlier investigation of employing a returns policy for perishable commodities to 
coordinate the distribution channel appeared in Pasternack (1985) where two extreme cases 
under the assumption of risk-neutral supply chain members are analyzed. It is impossible to 
achieve channel coordination if the manufacturer allows the retailer full credit for all unsold 
perishable goods or no returns for any unsold perishable goods. 
On the other hand, if the manufacturer offers retailers full credit for a partial return of goods 
this may achieve channel coordination in a single-retailer environment. Since the optimal 
return allowance will be a function of retailer demand, such a returns policy cannot be 
optimal in a multi-retailer environment. In contrast, he shows that a returns policy in which 
a manufacturer offers a partial credit for all unsold goods can achieve channel coordination 
in a multi-retailer environment. 
3.2 Style goods 
Style goods are characterized by highly uncertain demand, long production lead time and 
have little or no salvage value at the end of their short selling seasons of a few weeks or 
months. They include products such as computer software, hardware, compact discs, 
fashion items, greeting cards, books and pharmaceuticals. 
Mantrala and Raman (1999) study how the supplier’s wholesale-buyback price policy 
influence the retailer’s optimal order quantity decision with different levels of demand 
variability as well as study how demand uncertainty the profitability of both the suppliers and 
retailers. With demand variability remaining constant, supplier can induce the retailer to 
purchase more stock by increasing the buyback price and/or reducing the wholesale price.  
When demand uncertainty increases, the supplier tends to drop his optimal buyback price 
even though the buyer is ready to increase her order quantity at any given wholesale price. 
This indicates that the supplier finds that his expected costs of returns at the higher buyback 
price are too high relative to his expected revenues. In addition, at any given wholesale price 
level, the retailer's total profits as well as the total system profits fall as demand variability 
increases.  
On the other hand, at a very low wholesale price, the supplier does not find it optimal to 
accept returns at all and hence his optimal buyback price is zero.  However, the buyer is still 
willing to order larger amount of stocks at higher levels of uncertainty even without a 
buyback price offer provided the wholesale price is sufficiently low. Hence, increasing 
demand uncertainty works completely in favor of the supplier in this situation and thereby 
improves his expected profits. 
However, at the higher wholesale price, the supplier has to offer a large buyback price 
which significantly increases his expected costs of returns from the retailer, and thereby 
lowers his expected profits as demand uncertainty increases. 
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Finally, the supplier makes his largest profits at high wholesale prices accompanied by high 
buyback prices. With the right combination he can make the retailer purchase as much style 
goods as possible at a much lower wholesale price and no buyback price. 
3.2.1 Catalogue style goods 
Catalogue refers to a particular kind of style goods in which a retailer advertises an item at a 
particular price in a catalogue that is distributed to customers. Since cost considerations 
prohibit the frequent distribution of catalogues, the retailer must commit to a single price for 
an item for the entire selling season.  
With a price-dependent demand model, Emmons and Gilbert (1998) show that under 
demand uncertainty, a supplier using a returns policy for catalogue style goods to 
repurchase excess stock from the retailer at the conclusion of the period can improve the 
profits if demand follows a uniform distribution. They also find that there exists at least a 
wholesale price where returns policy is a ‘win–win’ strategy for retailer and supplier. The 
offer to buy back excess stock tends to increase the total combined profits of the retailer and 
manufacturer; hence it is not a zero-sum game. A manufacturer can "buy" the loyalty of a 
retailer relatively cheaply by decreasing the wholesale price by a small amount. It is always 
in the retailer's interest to have the manufacturer buy back unsold items at the end of the 
season, and the manufacturer also benefits from such arrangements when wholesale prices 
are sufficiently large. However, when the manufacturer sets his wholesale price optimally, 
he gains more from the offer of a returns policy than does the retailer. 
3.3 Experience goods 
Experience goods are goods for which idiosyncratic valuations such as buyer’s remorse are 
possible only after purchase. This is because customers do not fully know their preferences 
for the products at the time of purchase, but after they gain some experience with them. 
Returns policies for experience goods allow customers to defer their purchasing decisions 
until after gaining some experience with the products. A consumer who has learned that he 
does not like a product can cancel his purchase by simply returning it. These returns policies 
do not require customers to provide evidence or an explanation regarding the malfunction 
of the returned good. Instead, a customer not liking a product is often a sufficient reason for 
stores to accept the return. The "no-questions-asked" full refund policy is customary with 
many big retailers. 
According to Che (1996), returns polices for experience goods insure consumers against ex 
post loss, which allow a monopoly seller to charge a higher price. This is because under the 
returns policy, consumers can return the good after learning their valuations, at zero cost. 
However, the seller cannot induce consumers to buy at a price above their ex post 
valuations with a no-returns policy. This is because under the no-returns policy, consumers 
bear the entire risk associated with their uncertain ex post valuation. As risk aversion 
increases, the seller must lower her price to compensate consumers for the risk. 
Che (1996) also demonstrates that the returns policy is optimal if the consumers are 
sufficiently risk averse. This is because the returns policy eliminates a consumer's risk of 
paying more than his ex post valuation; hence the marginal consumer is not adversely 
affected by risk aversion. He also shows that returns policy is optimal if the retail costs are 
high. When the retail costs are high, the screening opportunity of the returns policy: seller 
can charge a high price and sell only to high-valuation consumers is relatively more 
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valuable since the seller can maintain her profit margin by selling only to high-valuation 
consumers. Furthermore, superior risk sharing makes consumers strictly better off under the 
returns policy as the consumers are protected from any loss and so they receive strictly 
positive expected utility. However, the seller's failure to internalize this benefit leads to too 
little adoption of the returns policy in equilibrium.  
3.4 Internet sales 
The e-business revolution in recent time has brought an alternative model for the part of the 
supply chain from the manufacturer to the customer. More and more manufacturers are 
now attempting to sell directly to the customers bypassing the traditional distributor-
wholesaler-retailer chain. Their motivation for this is to reduce the distribution cost and be 
more responsive to customers’ requirements. 
Customers also view  Internet purchase as advantageous because it drastically reduces the 
search cost and is convenient due to the fact that the store is open 24 hours per day seven 
days a week. In an Internet direct sales supply chain, the customers buy direct from the 
manufacturer, hence sacrificing the benefits of physical inspection of the product. This 
increases the probability that the customers will be dissatisfied with the product and likely 
to return it. Hence, a common customer’s concern is the lack of a proper returns policy for 
internet purchase and the complicated logistics for returning an item. As such, a clearly 
explained and generous returns policy will be welcomed by the customers and therefore 
will enhance demand.  
From the manufacturer’s point of view, a generous returns policy will increase customers’ 
confidence and hence increase sales revenue by inducing more customers to buy. On the other 
hand, returns policies would increase the cost of business substantially due to increased 
likelihood of return. Hence, returns policy constitutes a tradeoff and an optimum policy would 
be one whereby the resultant profit would be maximized. (Mukhopadhyay and Setoputro 
2004) The returns policy practice in e-business varies across industries and stores, and may 
range from unconditional money back guarantee to store credit only to no refund. 
Mukhopadhyay and Setoputro (2004) find out that in a market where customers are less price-
sensitive, the e-tailer can offer a more generous returns policy and at the same time will be able 
to charge higher price. Optimum pricing and returns policies will generate higher demand for 
the product but the e-tailer will also see higher return quantity. Overall, profit can be 
maintained at a higher level because the extra revenue from charging higher price and from 
increased sales outweighs the increase in cost due to increase in return quantity. 
In addition, they also find out that in a market where customer’s demand is increasingly 
more sensitive to the returns policy, the optimum price will increase and the e-tailer can 
offer more generous returns policy to increase sales. Although offering more generous 
returns policy will also increase return quantity, the e-tailer’s profit will not be reduced. This 
is because when customer is more sensitive to returns policy, e-tailer can charge higher price 
to offset the cost increase due to offering more generous returns policy.  
Results from the paper also show that when the customer is less sensitive to the rate of 
return parameter, offering generous or restrictive returns policy will not make much 
difference.  Hence, the e-tailer can offer more generous returns policy without affecting 
profit level. This can be observed in the arts industry where the customers are less sensitive 
to the rate of return parameter and so sellers generally offer more generous returns policy. 
On the other hand, when customer is sensitive to the rate of return parameter, e-tailer tends 
www.intechopen.com
Return Policies and Coordination of Supply Chain 
 
133 
to offer more restrictive returns policy because e-tailer is afraid that customers may abuse 
their returns policy. This can be seen in the electronic and apparel industries where the 
customers are widely known as sensitive to the rate of return parameter and so sellers often 
impose less generous returns policy on their customers.  
3.5 Build-to-order products 
A build-to-order product (BTO) is essentially built to customize the product to the requirement 
of the customers, hence increasing both lead time and cost of production. Firms are generally 
reluctant to offer a returns policy because the returned merchandise is practically useless as it 
was designed to meet the requirement of a particular customer. Hence returns policy will not 
be suitable in case of a BTO product with almost zero salvage value. 
Mukhopadhyay and Setoputro (2005) propose the concept of modularity in the institution of 
returns policies for BTO products. When a BTO product with modular design is returned, 
the product can be dismantled very easily producing a number of components which are 
standard products keeping their full value. This returned product will give back a large 
salvage value to the firm, thereby cutting down its loss due to the return. Hence, the 
company will incur a lower cost of return from the returned product when the level of 
modularity is higher. 
They also demonstrate that in the market where customer demand is more sensitive to the 
returns policy, the seller will offer more generous returns policy and simultaneously the 
optimum modularity level shall be increased. This is because since the BTO product is 
customized, offering a generous returns policy without increasing the modularity level will 
increase the cost of returning.  
In addition, in the market where the demand is increasingly more sensitive to the 
modularity level, the optimum modularity level will increase and the seller shall 
simultaneously offer more generous returns policy. Moreover, when the seller can decrease 
their product development and design costs, the optimum modularity level will increase 
and at the same time the firm can offer more generous returns policy. Furthermore, when 
the seller can salvage more from the returned product, the optimal returns policy and the 
optimum modularity level offered will increase. Generous returns policy is favorable when 
the retailer can obtain high salvage value for returned merchandise. 
4. Demand uncertainty 
This section will discuss how return policies will be affected by demand uncertainty. 
Manufacturers whose products are subject to uncertain demand face a problem of inducing 
distributors to stock those products. A manufacturer may attempt to compensate its 
distributors by agreeing to accept returns of unsold goods for full or partial refunds of their 
purchase price. 
4.1 Nature of demand uncertainty 
Marvel and Peck (1995) show that the manufacturer’s decision to accept returns depends 
crucially on the nature of demand uncertainty. Two cases of demand uncertainty are 
discussed in their paper. Valuation uncertainty occurs when firms are unsure about the 
willingness of customers to pay for the manufacturer’s product while arrival uncertainty 
occurs when firms do not know how many customers will arrive. When uncertainty applies 
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only to the valuation that consumers place on the manufacturer’s product, but not to arrival 
uncertainty, returns policies distort pricing without offsetting the inventory efforts. Prices 
are forced up while the expected quantity sold remains low and hence returns policies are 
not employed in the case of valuation uncertainty. On the other hand, if the manufacturer 
and retailer have a good idea about the amount consumers will be willing to pay for the 
product, but do not know how many consumers will arrive at the marketplace, a high return 
allowance is attractive to the manufacturer.  
In addition, the authors demonstrate that when arrival uncertainty is small relative to 
valuation uncertainty, the manufacturer chooses not to permit returns. However, increases 
in the arrival uncertainty parameter result in the institution of returns policies and the ratio 
of the returns to wholesale price rises rapidly with arrival uncertainty.  
Marvel and Peck (1995) also point out that return allowances are far more widespread in 
Japan than in United States. The fragmented nature of Japanese distribution into smaller 
units as compared to those in the West is a consequence of legal obstacles to construction of 
large stores. Distributing sales over a larger number of outlets will increase the arrival 
uncertainty at each individual outlet relative to the sales at that outlet. However, valuation 
uncertainty is unlikely to be affected at any individual outlet. As a result, the liberal return 
policies of Japanese manufacturers are a profit-maximizing adaptation to the fragmented 
nature of Japanese distribution.   
4.2 Multi-store retailer 
Mantrala and Raman (1999) study the impact of demand uncertainty on supplier’s returns 
policies for a multi-store style-good retailer.  In their research the retailer, assumed to be a 
central department store, had two different retail outlets whose demand may or not have 
been correlated and the retail outlets are not in competition. For any given non-optimal 
wholesale price and returns value, they numerically study how demand variability affected 
suppliers’ and retailers’ profits and return credits. At any given wholesale price, the 
supplier tends to drop his optimal buyback price as demand uncertainty increases even 
though the buyer is ready to increase her order quantity. On the other hand, at a very low 
wholesale price, the supplier in fact does not find it optimal to offer to accept returns at all; 
hence his optimal buyback price is zero. However, the supplier makes his largest profits at 
high wholesale prices accompanied by high buyback prices. 
4.3 Multi-item returns policy 
Brown, Chou and Tang (2008) study a multi-item returns policy called “pooled” (or joint) 
returns policy under which the distributor can return any combination of the products up to 
R percent of the total purchases across all products. They analyze the distributor's optimal 
profit and order quantity under the pooled returns policy, and compare these operating 
characteristics to the case when a single-item “non-pooled” returns policy is instituted. 
Under the non-pooled returns policy, the distributor can only return on individual items 
using item-specific return limits. 
Under the non-pooled policy, the distributor can return each product separately up to R 
percent of the purchase of that product. They show that the distributor will always achieve a 
higher profit under the pooled policy. They also show that the manufacturer could actually 
obtain a lower profit under the pooled policy due to a counter-intuitive result: the 
distributor may order less under the pooled policy even though the pooled policy offers 
more flexibility. This counter-intuitive result motivates them to determine the conditions 
under which the distributor would order less under the pooled policy. Finally, they develop 
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a heuristic for determining the distributor's optimal order quantities associated with the n-
product case under the pooled policy. 
5. Demand uncertainty with retail competition 
The papers by Marvel and Peck (1995) and Mantrala and Raman (1999) only consider the 
effect of demand uncertainty on returns policies. In this section, we will study the impact 
that demand uncertainty together with retailing competition have on returns policies.  
Padmanabhan and Png (1997) point out that when retailing is competitive but demand is 
certain, a returns policy intensifies retail competition and reduces the retailer margins, hence 
benefiting the manufacturer. On the other hand, when retailing is a monopoly while 
demand is uncertain, a returns policy helps the manufacturer by intensifying retail 
distribution, but hurts by encouraging excessive stocking. They also demonstrate that when 
there are both competing retailers and demand is uncertain; there is a trade-off between 
benefits of more intense retail competition and the costs of excessive stocking of a returns 
policy. As a result, the manufacturer shall adopt a returns policy if the marginal production 
cost and the demand uncertainty are sufficiently low. The lower the marginal cost and 
demand uncertainty, the greater will be the benefit from more intensive retail competition 
and the smaller will be the manufacturer’s loss from excessive stocking. Since the marginal 
costs of production of books, CDs and computer software are small in comparison to their 
price, returns polices are common in the distribution of books, recorded music and software. 
In addition, Yao, Wu and Lai (2005) study how demand variability and retailer’s 
competition interacts with manufacturers’ return prices in influencing retailer decisions on 
order size and retail price, and the implications for manufacturers’ policies and profitability 
of the parties in the supply chain. 
They point out that a returns policy always benefits the manufacturer. If the demand 
uncertainty and wholesale price are very high, the best decision of manufacturer is to 
provide either a return credit or full returns policy. However, channel profits, and 
particularly the expected profits of the retailers, may not fare well under this policy. If the 
manufacturer provides a lower wholesale price, the optimal decision of the manufacturer is 
not to provide any returns credit. 
They also demonstrate that the competing power of the retailer has an impact on the 
distribution channel members’ decisions. Intensifying the competition between two duopoly 
competing retailers will lead to a decline in both the retailers’ and the channel expected 
profits. In contrast, supplier’s expected profits are increasing as the supplier’s wholesale 
price increases with his setting the optimal returns price under all scenarios. The supplier’s 
action of setting high wholesale price leads to a high equilibrium retail price that in turn 
leads to a decline in market demand, thus resulting in a decrease in the retailers’ expected 
profits. Hence, although a returns policy can induce the retailer to order more so that the 
supplier’s profits and channel profits improve, the retailer’s expected profits are destroyed 
significantly. Furthermore, increasing the demand uncertainty works completely in favor of 
the supplier in this situation. On the other hand, in the higher uncertain demand situation, 
the retailers should adopt a risk-averse policy so that they can share more total profits. 
Furthermore, they find out that the price sensitivity factor has a significant impact on the 
returns policy. With low price sensitivity, the manufacturer does not generally adopt a 
returns policy, particularly in low demand uncertainty. In contrast, with high price 
sensitivity, the manufacturer will like to adopt a returns policy to improve his profits. 
However, the returns policy requires the support of the high wholesale price, which leads to 
the severe cannibalization of the retailers’ profits. 
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6. Conclusion 
We have come to the concluding section of this literature review. A returns policy provided 
by the manufacturer can coordinate the supply chain to maximize total channel profit. Any 
manufacturer may find that the benefits and costs of a returns policy pull in different 
directions and whether a manufacturer should accept returns depends on the balance 
between the benefits and costs.  
We have also looked at the different kinds of returns policies that are required to coordinate 
the supply chain for the different types of products, namely perishable commodities, style 
goods, catalogue style goods, experience goods, Internet sales and build-to-order products. 
In addition, we also study the impact of these return policies on the optimal pricing of the 
manufacturer and optimal order quantity decision of the retailer. 
We also discuss the impact that demand uncertainty alone have on return policies and 
extend our study to include the impact of both demand uncertainty and retailing 
competition on returns policies. 
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a growing acceptance that individual businesses can no longer compete as stand-alone entities but rather as
supply chains. Supply chain management (SCM) has been both an emergent field of practice and an
academic domain to help firms satisfy customer needs more responsively with improved quality, reduction cost
and higher flexibility. This book discusses some of the latest development and findings addressing a number of
key areas of aspect of supply chain management, including the application and development ICT and the
RFID technique in SCM, SCM modeling and control, and number of emerging trends and issues.
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